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Introduction 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was a very important region for the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ). During the Cold War, Prague always followed the 
developments in the region and waited for the opportunity to play a bigger role there. Despite 
the fact that Czechoslovakia had already successfully cooperated with some regional countries 
between the two world wars, following the end of World War II it was difficult to reestablish 
relations. One of the major reasons was the communist takeover in 1948, which crippled the 
relations with strongly anti-Communist states like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Second, 
Czechoslovakia played a key role in the establishment of the independent Israel. In the 1950s, 
following Josef Stalin´s death (1953) the Kremlin started to focus on the Arab states, which 
initiated a huge change in the Eastern Bloc countries’ Middle East policy. The Soviet Union 
changed its attitude toward towards the Third World, abolished the Zhdanov Doctrine (1947) 
in its foreign policy
1
 and supported the anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements across the 
world. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser was the first Arab leader, who made a 
rapprochement to the Soviet Union and built strong relations with the European socialist 
countries. Czechoslovakia, following the main foreign policy lines of the Soviet Union, 
pursued several goals– with success and failures - during the Cold War in MENA region.  
The following table includes Prague’s main objectives and political aims in the MENA 
region  in four periods between 1945 and 1989.  
 
 
The periods of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy in MENA region2   
 
                                                          
1
 The Zhdanov Doctrine was developed by Central Committee secretary Andrei Zhdanov in 1946. It declared 
that the world was divided into two camps: the "imperialistic" (capitalist states and empires) and 
"democratic“(the Communist countries) ones. The doctrine did not acknowledge the “third way” or the positive 
role of anti-colonial movements in the Third World, despite the fact that these were fighting against the “capital 
states” for their own independency.   
2
 Karel Sieber – Petr Zídek: ”Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989.” Praha: Ústav 
mezinárodních vztahů, 2009. p. 16-18. 
pre-1945-1955 The Czechoslovak leadership pursued a highly successful foreign policy 
in the Middle East and North Africa between the two world wars. First 
they contacted Egypt (1923), then Czechoslovak embassies were 
established in Iran (1925), Iraq (1933) and Saudi Arabia (1936). After 
World War II Prague wanted to continue its diplomacy with the Middle 
East and North African countries. 
1956-1967 The most intensive period, when the Czechoslovakian Army industries 
produced thousands of weapons which were sold to the Arab states. 
Prague also sent out its own military instructors and experts. The KSČ 
affiliated with Algeria, Iraq and Syria, but Egypt was the most important 
Arab country in the period. Czechoslovakia terminated the relationship 
with Israel after the Six Day War in 1967. 
1968-mid-1980s The Prague Spring had a negative impact on Arab-Czechoslovak relations. 
After 1968 Gustav Husák announced the “normalization”, and the KSČ 
turned its attention to interior politics. The “normalized” Czechoslovakia 
returned to the Middle East only in the mid-1970s. The most intensive 
relations were with Iraq (Saddam Hussein), Syria (Hafez al-Assad) and 
Libya (Muammar Gaddafi). 
1985-1989 In the last years of the Communist Czechoslovakia, Prague’s MENA 
policy suffered many blows. The Czechoslovak industry and economy had 
many problems, and the Arabian allies stopped to pay for the arms and 
products.The major objective of the period was South Yemen and the 
building of “scientific socialism” there. 
 
 
Categories of the MENA states from the view of the KSČ 
 
As the above table shows, the relevance of the MENA states were different for the 
Czechoslovak foreign policy. 
Conservative Arab monarchies did not establish diplomatic relations with 
Czechoslovakia and were very hostile to the socialist states. The Arab monarchs were famous 
about their anti-Communism. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar belonged to this group.  
Pro-Western pragmatic countries, despite their alliance with the West, had close a 
relationship with Prague. They did not only diplomatically recognize Czechoslovakia, but had 
a lot of economic cooperation. These states were Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia and Iran 
(under the  shah).  
Arab nationalist states were Czechoslovakia´s most important regional partners. The 
relations were strong and intensive, mostly in military trade, as Prague sent weapons, 
ammunition, vehicles and planes to these countries. Besides, several military experts helped 
train the local Arab armies. Syria, Egypt (during Nasser), Libya (Gaddafi), Iraq (Saddam) and 
North Yemen (until 1970) were the primary Arab nationalist partners. 
South Yemen had a special role in Czechoslovakian foreign policy, particularly after 
the founding of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970). The building of 
“scientific Marxism” was a major effort for the KSČ, since it wanted to prove that socialism is 
an option for the Arabs.  
Israel, following its establishment, was the most important state for Czechoslovakia in 
the MENA region. Weapons were sent to Israel and even Czechoslovak pilots were fighting in 
the Israeli Air Force in the first Arab-Israeli war (1948). Later the weapon supplies to Israel 
were diminished, in consequence of the Slánský trial and the Soviet-Israeli split.3 
Czechoslovakia terminated its relationship with Israel after the Six Day war in 1967.  
 
Czechoslovakia’s policies and objectives toward the Middle Eastern countries 
 
Political and ideological policies 
During the Cold War Czechoslovakia was one of the countries, where the leadership took the 
communist and socialist ideology very seriously. Since the spreading of the ideology was the 
main purpose of the KSČ,  Prague´s foreign policy was not often determined by pragmatism. 
Furthermore, it was important for the Czechoslovak leadership to know how the leaders of the 
countries they are closely cooperating with, are dealing with the local communist movements 
and intellectuals. Therefore, it often happened that despite the fact that they had good 
relations before, Prague abruptly changed its policy and did not care much about the 
consequences.
4
   
                                                          
3
 The Slánský trial was a „trial of anti-state conspiracy centered on Rudolf Slánský" in 1952, who was later 
executed. Slánský was a pro-Israeli politician and with 13 other leading party members (11 of them Jews) was 
accused of participating in a “Trotskyite-Titoite-Zionist conspiracy” against KSČ leader, Klement Gottwald. 
Even Israeli citizens were arrested, which made a huge diplomatic crisis between the two countries.  
4
 In 1963, when Iraqi President Abd al-Karim Qasim was assassinated and the Ba'ath Party took power, Prague 
wanted to cut diplomatic relations with Baghdad, terminate all Czechoslovak projects in the country, isolate Iraq 
in the region and recall all the Czechoslovak experts and teachers from the country.  They thought that the “Iraqi 
Before the Czechoslovak-Arab arms deal in 1955 Prague was not much interested in the 
MENA. The KSČ thought that most of the Arab states were allies of the West and sooner or 
later they would all join the Bagdad Pact (1955). Even the relations with Egypt started very 
difficult: the Czechoslovak press and leadership declared the coup of the Free Officers’ 
Movement and the fall of the monarchy (1952) an “American friendly development”. Later 
when the Free Officers persecuted and banned the Egyptian Communist Party, they called 
Nasser a “fascist dictator”.5  
However, when Nasser was disappointed in the West (mostly the United States), 
because they did not send weapons to Egypt and the border conflicts with Israel got worse, it 
was vital to arm the Egyptian Army with new weapons. At the Bandung Conference in April 
1955, Nasser asked Zhou Enlai, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China to sell 
weapons to Egypt. Zhou Enlai refused, but after the conference he contacted Moscow. In 
1955 the Kremlin was worried about the Bagdad Pact, which threatened to isolate the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East and Central Asia. Therefore, Moscow started to play an active role 
in the MENA region and Egypt was a potential ally to bypass the Pact effects.  But the 
Kremlin wanted a “cover state” that would supply the Egyptian Army with weapons. They 
were afraid of the consequences of a direct Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, which could initiate an 
arms race in the region. The ideal partner was Czechoslovakia, which was famous for its 
weapon production. In September 1955, Czechoslovakia concluded an arms deal with Egypt, 
which caused panic in the West and their MENA allies, but other states in the region (Syria 
and North Yemen) began to look to Prague. Even the pro-Western regional countries started 
to establish relations with Czechoslovakia and opened embassies in the late 1950s, for 
example Tunisia and Morocco.  
In the 1960s an excellent opportunity arose for the Czechoslovak leadership to support 
the fight for independence (Algeria), and increase its influence in the newly independent 
countries. The aim was to help the “advanced movements” to achieve a “socialist way of state 
building”. The leadership hoped that the Communist Parties could get into power and would 
be good allies to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to counterweigh Western influence in 
the region. They expected that these allies would support Prague’s and Moscow’s stance in 
the United Nations. Until 1968 Czechoslovakia was one of the biggest supporter of the Arab 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Free Officers are fascist and western puppets”. Only the Soviet Union and other socialist states (Hungary) 
prevented the break of relations between Czechoslovakia and Iraq. MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Csehszlovákia TÜK 
1945-1964, 20. D. Csehszlovákia Irakkal kapcsolatos külpolitikai irányelveinek felterjesztése.(October 20, 1963) 
5
 Tareq Ismael:The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988.  New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990. 
p.87. 
Communist Parties and every year there was a conference or “ideological education” in 
Prague. Sometimes this attitude and the strong ideological assistance caused diplomatic 
conflicts with Arab nationalist regimes. Despite the fact that the relations with these countries 
were the most beneficial for Prague, the KSČ always criticized the Arab leaders, when they 
suppressed the local Communist movements and intellectuals.
6
 But later Prague realized that 
the Communist Parties have a very fragile position in the Arab countries, with a minimal 
influence on the public opinion, only a few members in the cities and they do not have any 
reliable or rational political programs.
7
 At the same time “heretic” communist countries 
(Yugoslavia or after the Sino-Soviet split China) were also disturbing the Czechoslovak 
ideology-based influence as they projected a very intensive propaganda of “their own way of 
communism” in the MENA region.  
In the KSČ the role of the ideological factor decreased after Egypt’s president Anwar 
Sadat expelled the Soviet and Czechoslovak experts, minimalized relations with the Eastern 
Bloc and turned to the United States. In the late 1970s and 1980s Prague did not care about 
the position of the local Communist Parties in the Arab countries any more and the “colour of 
the political systems” was irrelevant. For example, the main political partners were Saddam 
Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi, who also persecuted the leftist and “advanced movements”. 
Only South Yemen was an exception. The KSČ hoped that the local Communists will 
succeeded. In that case South Yemen would have been a “shining example” of Arab 
Communism, which could be exported in the whole MENA region. Despite of the intensive 
support and aid, this project was a huge failure and disappointment for the Eastern Bloc.
8
 
 
Economic relations and investments  
Another key reason of Czechoslovakia´s interest in the Middle East and Africa, was 
trade and investments. The KSČ wanted to make long term trade, financial, loan and other 
economic agreements with the MENA countries to ensure Czechoslovak import/export 
                                                          
6
 For example, after the unification Egypt and Syria (1958) Nasser started a very strong anti-communist 
propaganda and interior policy. Hundreds of intellectuals and activists were imprisoned and the Egyptian 
newspapers were attacking the Communist Bloc countries claiming that they were supporting “anarchy and 
coups” in the Arab country (mostly in Syria). Czechoslovakia criticized Nasser and there were disputes among 
the leaders in KSČ that Prague should reduce its relations with Egypt and cancel common projects. 
7
 MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Egyiptom TÜK 1945-64, 7. D. Konzultáció a csehszlovák KÜM-mal afrikai és arab 
országok tekintetében. (November 21, 1964) 
8
 Modernization could not eliminate the semi-feudal, tribal system. Poverty and unemployment grew and the 
Aden leadership turned the worker-peasant class against him. Also the coups, unrests and civil wars were almost 
everyday occurrence and despite a lot of aid from the socialist countries, South Yemeni economy and security 
remained instable and fragile.  
from/to region. Also in the newly indepedent countries they wanted to supersede the former 
colonial powers (France, Great-Britain) and the new external actors, like the United States, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. Prague wanted new markets for the 
Czechoslovak goods and products, which included textiles, shoes, sugar and porcelain, but 
there was a high demand for heavy machinery, cars, trains, airplanes and weapons as well.  
The KSČ also wanted to import things, which the country did/could not produce and sought 
for a diversified import  to avoid dependence on the West. The  MENA countries were 
cheaper sources than Western Europe or pro-Western countries. The goods Czechoslovakia 
needed were oil, phosphate, black carbon, non-ferrous metals, nickel, iron, copper, citrus 
fruits, leather, and, most important of all, cotton. Czechoslovakia imported hundreds of tons 
of cotton annually from all over the world, but its most important supplier was Egypt. In its 
economic relations, therefore, Cairo was Prague´s “number one priority” in the Middle East. 
After the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia had the strongest economic relations and the biggest 
trade volume with that Arab country. In the 1960s, Egypt was responsible for 75% of the 
trade volume between the Eastern Bloc and the MENA countries. Among the socialist 
countries Czechoslovakia was its second biggest (25%) trade partner right after the Soviet 
Union.
9
 But when Sadat broke the relations with Czechoslovakia, Syria and Libya became the 
main economic partners in the MENA. Economic contracts between Czechoslovakia and 
Syria amounted to $100.000.000. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya was considered the “best 
customer”, because he always paid in time and in Western “hard” currencies (dollar, West 
German mark), and was thus one of the biggest foreign currency providers for the 
Czechoslovak (but also for other socialist) banks.  
Yet, it was not always the “progressive Arab regimes”, which were the best customers. 
Prague had many economic disputes with them over interest rates, repayment periods or 
currencies. There were, however, problems when  the Arab nationalist leaderships sometimes 
forgot to pay for the goods, thinking that the Czechoslovak products were aid and assistance, 
and there was no need to pay for them. There are documents and reports showing that 
business relations with Western friendly countries were in some cases more extensive than 
with Arab nationalist states.
10
 They had better and higher quality products and raw materials 
(Jordan, Morocco), had bigger and not so regulated markets (Turkey, Tunisia) or they just 
paid in time with “hard currency”.  
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 MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-k, Csehszlovákia Admin 1945-64, 13. D. Konzultáció a Cseh külügyminiszterrel Afrika 
témában. Az afrikai országok irányában folytatott csehszlovák külpolitika koncepciója. (July 15, 1961) 
10
 MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-k, Csehszlovákia Admin 1945-64, 13. D. Konzultáció a Cseh külügyminiszterrel Afrika 
témában. Az afrikai országok irányában folytatott csehszlovák külpolitika koncepciója. (July 15, 1961)  
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that sometimes other Eastern Bloc countries were 
the biggest rivals for Prague in the MENA region. The commercial legations and offices of 
the socialist countries barely cooperated; the economic attachés lied to each other or held back 
some crucial market information; and they tried to discredit the other’s product quality. That 
caused much tension among Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War. For example, in 
Egypt the German Democratic Republic Wartburg cars pushed out the Czech Škoda for a 
short period; in Jordan Czech and Polish businessmen competed for phosphate; and Prague 
and Budapest always disputed about who would buy iron ore from Iraq or crude oil from 
Iran.
11
 
 
Arms sales  
Czechoslovakia has been famous for its arms production during the Cold War. The country 
had a great heavy industry and weapon production complex; the Czechoslovak Army had its 
own developed guns, aircraft and tanks.
12
 In the 1980s Czechoslovakia was the seventh 
largest arms exporter in the world, after the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, 
Great Britain and West Germany.
13
 
For the Czechoslovak leadership the “ticket to the Middle East” was the 
Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal in 1955. This agreement signaled the gradual opening of 
the Soviet arsenal, first to Egypt and then to other allies in the Middle East. This was the first 
sizable arms deal between one Eastern Bloc country and an Arab state, the value of which 
amounted to $250 million. During the so called “Mission 105” Egypt bought (mostly Soviet 
produced) MiG-15 aircraft, 220 pieces of BTR-152 APC, 200 T-34 tank, 12 gunships, 200 
anti-tank rockets and a great number of small arms.
14
 Along with the weapons, many 
Czechoslovak instructors, training pilots and advisors arrived in Egypt as well. The 
consequences of this deal were significant and not just for Czechoslovakia and Egypt. An 
American-Israeli ”Sovietologist”, Galia Golan said that this was a “dramatic proof of the 
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 MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Egyiptom TÜK 1945-64, 10. D. Beszélgetés a csehszlovák politikai beosztottal. (May 
8, 1958) 
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 The most famous small arm was the Sa vs. 58 (Samopal vzor 58). It was used in great numbers not only by the 
Czechoslovak People's Army, but it could be found in most third world countries, like Cuba, Guatemala, 
Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Libya, Mozambique and Vietnam.  
13
 ”Csehország már nem fegyvergyártó nagyhatalom.” Origo, (2002. 03. 13.) 
http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/hirek/20020313csehorszag.html (Downloaded 2015.11.11.) 
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 Karel Sieber – Petr Zídek: ”Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–1989.” Praha: Ústav 
mezinárodních vztahů, 2009. p. 57. 
near-east policy and relations [of the Soviets].”15 The West was shocked to realize the 
influence and outreach of the Soviet Union in the MENA region. Czechoslovakia became 
popular and Nasser acted as the middleman between the KSČ (and of course Moscow) and the 
Arab nationalist states. Egypt became an example of an alternative: after 1955 if an Arab 
country wanted to modernize its army, there was no need to accept the demands of the West 
(like joining the Bagdad Pact). Nasser acted on behalf of Syria and Yemen in organizing arms 
deals with Czechoslovakia in January and July 1956. The arms deals were of high importance 
for Czechoslovakia as well, because they introduced a new model of cooperation in the Cold 
War. After 1955, the Soviet Union could not deliver weapons directly to Third World 
countries, but via Czechoslovakia. Later on, Moscow used Czechoslovakia as a transit route 
not only to Arab states but also to Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola etc.  
The position of Czechoslovakia as an arms supplier to Arab countries was 
paradoxically confirmed by their defeat in the Six Day War, which led to more orders of arms 
from Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Iraq.
16
 But after Nasser’s death and the Yom Kippur War 
(1973) the new Egyptian leadership and military command was dissatisfied with the quality of 
the Soviet made weapons. The loss of Egypt was a big trauma not only for Czechoslovakia, 
but also for the whole Eastern Bloc. The only hope was Syria, which became the most 
important Arab arms customer for Czechoslovakia in the mid-1970s. Up to 1972 they had 
signed several arms contracts amounting to 25-30 million dollars. However, later Damascus 
stopped the repayment of the loan installments, which caused tensions between the two 
countries. At the same time the Soviet Union concluded ownarms trade agreements directly 
and in more significant numbers than the Czechoslovak weapon factories. During Hafez al-
Assad‘s rule, Syria purchased Soviet weapons for 25 billion dollars.17  
From the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s Czechoslovak foreign 
policy was suffering  failures in the Middle East, which went hand in hand with the decrease 
of arms exports. The Czechoslovak leadership concluded significant arms deals only in three 
MENA countries. One of them was Iraq, which used these weapons in the Iran–Iraq war 
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 Galia Golan: Soviet policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbatchev. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p.45. 
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 Besides weapons services by Czechoslovak soldiers and pilots were also provided. After the war, on June 19, 
1967, an Egyptian delegation sent by Nasser paid a visit to Prague to negotiate with Anton Novotný. The 
Egyptian delegation wanted “more and more modern Czechoslovak aircrafts with (Czechoslovak!) pilots. In the 
next war against Israel, the Egyptian pilots would bomb Israeli objects while the pilots of the Eastern Bloc 
would defend Egypt’s territory.”  Karel Sieber – Petr Zídek: Československo a Blízký východ v letech 1948–
1989. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2009. p.78. 
17
 4600 tanks, 600 airplanes, 170 helicopters and two submarines.  Barry Rubin:The Truth about Syria. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p.55.  
(1980-1988). The other important partner was Libya, where, despite the arms embargo, 
Czechoslovakia continued to deliver arms. After the visit of the Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi to Prague in 1978 Czechoslovak arms sales increased vastly.
18
 Prague also sent most 
its military advisors and trainers. Between 1977 and 1979 about 900 Czechoslovak Army 
members were in Libya. There was a close cooperation between the ŠtB (Czechoslovakia’s 
State Security) and Libyan secret services as well. The results of this cooperation were the 
armament of the PLO and the Lockerbie plane bombing in 1988 with Semtex.
19
 The biggest 
problem with these arms deliveries was the fact that in the late 1980s most of the Arab 
regimes stopped to pay. Not only because they did not have enough money, but they could not 
offer anything in return for the weapons. They thought it was a “gift” to them to strengthen 
Arab positions in the region and fight against Israel.
20
  
It should also be mentioned that Prague’s arms sales were not dependent on ideology. 
After the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal  regional Western allies (Iran, Jordan, North 
Yemen and Morocco) became interested, ordered and received Czechoslovak weapons. For 
example after the Six Day War Morocco bought tanks (T-54, SD-100), transporters (OT-64 
SKOT) and small arms, with a value of 18 million USD.
21
 North Yemen, despite being a 
monarchy, established closer ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. 
Sana’a was the third among Arab states that concluded a huge arms deal with Prague in July 
1956.
22
  
 Furthermore, Prague sold arms during the regional conflicts and civil wars, besides 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, also the civil wars in Yemen, Oman and Lebanon. But the most 
“ideology-free arms supply” took place during the Iraq-Iran war. Czechoslovakia  supplied 
not only Iraq with arms, but also the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was not surprising, therefore, 
that Czechoslovak weapons and vehicles were used against each other on the battlefield.
23
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 Dozens of fighters (MiG 21,MiG 23) and bombers (Su-22), 100 BM–21 Grad rocket launchers, 400-550 T-72 
MBT, 1200 military vehicles (mostly transporters), 15 000 hand grenades, 10 000 landmines, and 30 000-50 000 
small arms. 
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 The Semtex (named after Semtín, a suburb of Pardubice in Czechoslovakia) was produced in the 1950s by 
Stanislav Brebera, a chemist. Prague exported around 960 tons of Semtex until the mid-1980s to Libya. After the 
death of 259 passengers on Pan Am Flight 103, there was a huge pressure on Czechoslovakia to stop Semtex 
export and to provide information about the Libyan export. Karel Sieber – Petr Zídek: Československo a Blízký 
východ v letech 1948–1989. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2009. p. 216. 
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 Syria had already discontinued the repayment of loan instalments by the 1980s. Due to this Damascus 
accumulated a public debt of 900.000.000 US dollars towards Czechoslovakia. 
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 One year later North Yemen received 14 airplanes, 150 MBTs (medium battle tanks) and 1000 AA guns, 
rockets, anti-tank weapons and ammunitions. 
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 Between 1981-1988 Iraq received 600 BMP-1s from Czechoslovakia, while Prague supported Iran with 300 
BMP-1s and OT-64s. 
  
 
Cultural and scientific cooperation 
 
The cultural aspect of bilateral relations was not among the main objectives, but 
sometimes and in some cases enjoyed a high priority in the Czechoslovak foreign policy. A 
successful cultural event, trip or show was a good start for Prague to establish or strengthen 
existing diplomatic relations. For example, Czechoslovak singers, actors,  musicians, artists, 
sportsmen – especially football players – and their plays, exhibitions, concerts, or 
presentations were a “good weapon” in the fight for Arab “hearts and minds”. Furthermore, 
these events helped to build a positive image of Czechoslovakia and the Eastern Bloc in the 
MENA region. That is why Prague spent a lot of resources on Arabic-language propaganda. 
The Arabic-language Czechoslovak Bulletin was well known across the Middle East and very 
popular in intellectual and political circles.
24
 There was a close cooperation between the ČTK 
(Czech News Agency) and regional news agencies, but this was expensive and was 
sometimes affected by the countries’ actual policy. Among the cultural events the 
broadcasting of the Czechoslovak radio Arabic service in Egypt (1959) and the Czechoslovak 
film presentations and film weeks in Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad should also be 
mentioned.  
But there were problems even in this segment of bilateral relations. Czechoslovak 
embassies and consulates did not work together with the Arab press, TVs and news agencies 
or their relations were weak. Prague sent only a few press attachés to the MENA countries, 
for example until the mid-1960s there served cultural diplomats only in Egypt and Tunisia. 
The KSČ spent much less on the cultural-propaganda programs than the West. Czech and 
Soviet books or films – which were mostly propaganda and documentaries - could not match 
West-European and Hollywood productions.  
The main goal and objective of the Czechoslovak cultural diplomacy was to show the 
benefits of cooperation with the Eastern Bloc. Prague also sought to discredit the “capital 
societies” and “western countries”, presenting the United States, West Germany and Japan as 
the “new imperialists” in the MENA region, which did not care about the locals or national 
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 In 1960s the Bulletin was sold in 30 000-40 000 copies through the whole Middle East: half of that in Egypt, 
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freedom, but wanted only profits. In parallel there was also an effort to “cut the wildings of 
the socialism” or “show the true face of the heretic communist states” (like Yugoslavia and 
from the middle 1960s China), which falsified Marxism.
25
  But the main goal was to attract an 
increasing number of students, doctors or engineers to come to study in Czechoslovakia. The 
KSČ paid a special attention to the education of African and Arab experts, students and even 
official cadres. Millions were spent on fellowships, stipendiums, field trips or professional 
practices in Czechoslovakia. The KSČ hoped that when these people go back home, they 
would “spread the socialist ideology”, strengthen the local Communist Parties or they get in 
high positions in the political, economic or military spheres.  
However, this ambitious program of attracting foreigners was not without problems. 
Most of the potential students did not speak Czech, had no knowledge of Eastern Europe and 
Czechoslovakia, and sometimes could not read and write properly even in his own language.  
Some of them did not bother about learning and regularly got into trouble and were expelled 
from the country.
26
 But Prague not only trained a future generation of experts in 
Czechoslovakia, but also sent its own to the MENA region. Thousands of experts, engineers, 
geologists, doctors, teachers, professors and archaeologists travelled to, lived and worked in 
Third World countries - always under strict conditions. The Czechoslovak experts should not 
just be highly trained and speak the native language (or at least English or French), but they 
should be “ideologically well-trained” to propagate the benefits of Communism and stronger 
relations with Czechoslovakia. The main destinations were the Arab nationalist 
regimes,especially Egypt. Between 1955 and 1975 a weapons factory (Helwan), radio and 
TV-stations (Cairo), a plywood mill (Alexandria), a power plant (El-Mahalla El-Kubra), 
irrigation canals, cement plants and sugar factories were built with the help of Czechoslovak 
experts. Prague contributed to the industrialization of Syria as well: oil refineries (Homs), an 
oil-processing factory (Omar), a dam in Al-Rastan, thermal power-plants (Homs, Hama), four 
sugar refineries, a brewery (Damascus), three radio broadcasters, a tyre factory (Ilama), a 
distillery (Damascus), seven grain mills, two shoe factories (Damascus, Homs), high-voltage 
lines and military structures, like the radar station in the Golan Heights, barracks and airports 
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 Sometimes the political events in the homeland also affected the fate of the foreign students. After the Iraqi 
Baath Party took power, Prague expelled dozens of Iraqi intellectuals and students from the country, who loudly 
supported the coup or had relations with the new political leadership. Around 280 Iraqi students studied in 
Czechoslovak universities at the time. Later the same happened when Prague and Cairo mutually sent back home 
students and experts in 1970s.  
were built by Czechoslovak manpower.
27
 Czechoslovak hospitals, schools (with around 100 
Czechoslovak teachers and professors), cotton processing facilities and irrigation canals were 
constructed in Iraq. The most intensive – but not paid – Czechoslovak projects were in South 
Yemen after the “turn to the socialist way” in the 1980s. Hundreds of Czechoslovak experts 
helped the construction of roads, bridges, airports, ports (in Aden) and factories.  
But Czechoslovak specialists and experts were working even in the pro-Western 
countries. North Yemen, Jordan and Tunisia invited Czechoslovak experts during the Cold 
War. Dozens of doctors were practicing in the hospitals and the countries always paid the 
Czechoslovak workers on time.
28
 But sometime the presence and work of an Eastern Bloc 
citizen caused diplomatic tensions. For example in the 1960s, when Czechoslovak instructors 
started to construct sugar factories in Iran (Shiraz and Isfahan), Washington did everything to 
stop the construction and questioned Tehran on this move.
29
 The same happened in Libya 
(before Gaddafi) and in North Yemen (during the Imam’s rule), when Czechoslovak 
geologists were drilling in the dessert, searching for crude oil or water.  
Finally, cultural and scientific cooperation, despite the political will or economic and 
technical cooperation agreements were also slow in negotiation and realization. Bureaucracy 
produced many obstacles, and the political developments or coups in the host country always 
delayed, sometimes even prevented the projects. Another problem was that officially the 
Czechoslovak experts got 75% of their salaries in the host country (the remaining at home), 
but often the hosts forgot to pay them. In the background there were economic reasons or 
sometimes political motives.
30
 Sometimes it was also dangerous to live and work in an 
African or Middle Eastern country. In wars, civil wars, coups or riots the foreigners were 
potential targets and the authorities could not always guarantee their safety. It was not rare 
either that other states made a better offer to the host country and the Czechoslovak program 
was deleted. This was further aggravated by the fact that the socialist states were also 
competing with each other, driven by the same ideological goals, offering similar level 
services at similar prices, etc.  
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 Tunisia was the main target among the West-allied MENA countries. In 1963, 168 Czechoslovak experts 
worked in the country. One year later their number reached 200. Not just geologists and engineers, but there 
were one hundred doctors, nurses and pharmacists among them. Sometimes the Czechoslovak doctors were 
operating a whole hospital in Tunisian cities. MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Egyiptom TÜK 1945-64, 7. D. Konzultáció 
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 For example, Imam Yahya (North Yemen) by lagging behind with the payments wanted to achieve that the 
experts from the Eastern Bloc leave the country.  That is why Sana’a did not pay for the Hodeida hospital, the 
geological drilling and the Ahmadi Port. 
  
 
Conclusion – The Golden Age 
 
Czechoslovakia was truly active in the MENA region only in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal was the first sign of Prague’s – and of course 
Moscow’s – bigger role in the Arab World.  In that decade Czechoslovakia served to cover up 
Soviet penetration into the region. Meanwhile it trained many Arabexperts, technicians, 
engineers etc. and they provided a helping hand in the modernization of their relevant 
countries and of the region. Furthermore, Prague’s economic interests were complemented by 
Moscow’s geostrategic interests, which meant that the Soviet Union – sometimes directly, 
sometimes implicitly – supported Czechoslovak business in the Arab nationalist states.  
But this position was was shaken after in the end of the 1960s. First reason was the 
Prague Spring. The new leadership turned to the interior politics and the removal of series of 
diplomats undermined the efficiency of Czechoslovak foreign policy.  Second, Czechoslovak 
foreign policy was continuously suffering from failings in the region after the loss of Egypt. It 
is true that other Arab nationalist states (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria etc.) followed and also 
built closer ties with Czechoslovaki, but these relationships had many problems and 
difficulties and were not so fruitful as the (former) relationship with Cairo. Most of these 
Arab regimes stopped paying for the arms supplies, economic loans and even the work done 
by Czechoslovak citizens. In the 1980s Prague’s foreign policy was conducted in an 
atmosphere of increasing passivity and indifference by the leaders. 
It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to say that the 1950s and 1960s meant the “golden 
age” of Czechoslovak MENA-policy. After the Prague Spring the Czechoslovak leadership 
attempted to restore it, but most of the attempts were unsuccessful.  
 
 
 
 
